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Abstract
Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence
of future atrocities is at best a plausible but largely untested assumption. Actual experience with
efforts at deterrence is not encouraging. Before placing too much reliance on deterrence as a
basis for supporting international criminal prosecutions, especially over possible alternatives such
as truth and reconciliation commissions, we ought at least to consider carefully the obstacles to
achieving effective deterrence.

ATROCITIES, DETERRENCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
David Wippman*
INTRODUCTION
Enthusiasm for international criminal prosecutions is running high. For advocates of peace through justice, the last decade of the twentieth century marks a turning point in international legal history comparable only to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of the 1940s. Many internationalists view the increased
use of international criminal law, reflected in the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals, the Pinochet proceedings, and the Rome
agreement on a statute for a permanent international criminal
court (or "ICC"), as the last, best hope for stemming the tidal
wave of atrocities that all too frequently have marked both international and internal armed conflicts.
One of the principal arguments made in favor of international criminal prosecutions is that they can serve to deter the
commission of future atrocities. This argument was regularly advanced as one of the main justifications for the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY" or "Tribunal"). Unwilling in 1993 to take strong military action to control the bitter conflict then tearing Bosnia
apart, the U.N. Security Council expressed its hope that the
ICTY would "contribute to ensuring" that violations of international humanitarian law "are halted and effectively addressed."1
Supporters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (or "ICC Statute") routinely urge ratification on deterrence grounds.2 Similarly, the international human rights community enthusiastically embraced the initiation of criminal proceedings against General Augusto Pinochet in substantial part
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. UN SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
2.

UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTARIES ON THE ESTAB-

LISHMENT OF AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (adopted by the United Nations on July 17,
1998) <http://www.un.org/icc> (visited Feb. 3, 2000) (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) [hereinafter ICC Statute]; Gerard E. O'Connor, The PursuitofJustice
and Accountability: Why the United States Should Support the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 927, 972 (1999).
COURT,
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because it hoped that other dictators in the making would witness Pinochet's plight and themselves avoid the criminal acts
that made Pinochet subject to extradition for torture and related
crimes in the first place.' With this in mind, some human rights
organizations, Human Rights Watch in particular, are working to
4
identify and seek prosecution of other "traveling tyrants."
Of course, supporters of the ICTY, the ICC, and Pinochetstyle prosecutions have many reasons other than deterrence on
which to base their advocacy of international criminal prosecutions, including considerations of justice, respect for international law, retribution, avoidance of personal vengeance, de-legitimation of indicted war criminals as political leaders, and national reconciliation. But for many, deterrence is the most
important justification, and the most important goal.
Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a
plausible but largely untested assumption. Actual experience
with efforts at deterrence is not encouraging. During the course
of World War II, the Allies made the prosecution of German and
Japanese leaders a major war aim. Beginning in 1941, the
United States and the United Kingdom issued a series of highly
publicized warnings that violations of the laws of war would be
punished, and that superior orders would not be accepted as a
defense. 5 Allied radio and press explicitly warned the German
population that there would be criminal trials for "the systematic
murder of the Jews of Europe."6 Similarly, in the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council and various individual states repeatedly warned combatants that those committing atrocities would
eventually be prosecuted. But, as Professor Theodor Meron has
observed, "there is no empirical evidence of effective deterrence
in either case." 7
3. The Pinochet Decision, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (visited Nov. 17, 1999) <http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/chile98/index.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
4. See Reed Brody, One Year Later, the "PinochetPrecedent" Puts Tyrants on Notice, BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1999, at A19.
5. See Benjamin Ferencz, InternationalCriminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10
PACE INT'L L. REV. 203 (1998); Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L.
REv, 107, 110 (1995).
6. See Ferencz, supra note 5, at 210.
7. Meron, supra note 5, at 110; Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the
Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 744 (1999) (stating that Payam Akhavan, Legal
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There are several possible responses to the apparent ineffectiveness of past and present war crimes prosecutions as a mechanism for deterring ongoing atrocities. First, although atrocities
have continued following warnings of prosecution and, in the
case of Yugoslavia, following actual prosecutions, it does not follow that the prosecutions have had no deterrent effect. There is
at least modest anecdotal evidence to suggest that some individual actors in the former Yugoslavia have adhered more closely to
the requirements of international humanitarian law than they
would have otherwise, for fear of prosecution.' The fact that
atrocities nonetheless persisted at high levels in the former Yugoslavia, even after the work of the ICTY began, shows only that the
Tribunal's efforts have not succeeded in deterring enough perpetrators to make a visible impact on the course of events. Second, even if the existing level of prosecutions is inadequate for
large-scale deterrence, it may be that more consistent prosecutions, comparable in frequency and consistency to prosecutions
for similarly grave offenses in effective national legal systems,
would deter the future commission of such crimes. This conclusion is drawn by Professor Theodor Meron, who argues that
"[i]nstead of despairing over the prospects of deterrence, the
international community should enhance the probability of punishment by encouraging prosecutions before the national courts,
especially of third states, by making ad hoc Tribunals effective,
and by establishing a vigorous, standing international criminal
court."9 Third, prosecutions might also serve an important signaling and educational function. As Payam Akhavan, Legal Advisor to the ICTY has argued, even if prosecutions fail to deter
culpable individuals from committing further offenses in the
course of ongoing conflicts, prosecutions might nonetheless reinforce the applicable international norms and contribute to the
eventual, if admittedly distant, establishment of a political culture that regards the commission of atrocities as unacceptable.' °
Each of these possible responses is plausible, and may be
correct. But before placing too much reliance on deterrence as
Advisor to Office of Prosecutor of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY'), similarly notes that "the evidence of the tribunal's contribution to
the deterrence of ongoing humanitarian law violations remains equivocal.
).
8. Akhavan, supra note 7, at 750-51.
9. Meron, supra note 5, at 110-11.
10. Akhavan, supra note 7, at 743-51.
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a basis for supporting international criminal prosecutions, especially over possible alternatives such as truth and reconciliation
commissions, we ought at least to consider carefully the obstacles
to achieving effective deterrence.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF SPECIFICDETERRENCE
As Akhavan notes, "[d] eterrence broadly defined is the ability of a legal system to discourage or prevent certain conduct
through threats of punishment or other expression of disapproval." 1 Deterrence takes two forms. Specific deterrence refers to the capacity of a legal system to induce individual perpetrators not to commit additional crimes. General deterrence discourages "potential criminal behavior in society at large .... ",12
Arguments of specific deterrence generally take the form of
rational actor calculations. In brief, the assumption is that perpetrators confronted with the prospect of being held criminally
accountable for acts in violation of international humanitarian
law will avoid committing such acts to escape prosecution. The
difficulties with such arguments are many.
Even if we assume that those committing atrocities engage
in rational cost-benefit calculations (weighing the risk of prosecution against the personal and political gain of continued participation in ethnic cleansing and similar acts), most probably
view the risk of prosecution as slight. As Professor Meron points
out, criminal prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity are rare.13 Unfortunately, that is true even
with respect to former Yugoslavia, despite the establishment of
the ICTY. To date, the ICTY has issued ninety-one public indictments, but has tried and sentenced only six individuals in the
course of its six-year existence. 4 Despite the ICTY's many impressive achievements, these numbers are minuscule relative to
the numbers of persons actually responsible for criminal violations of international humanitarian law. Worse, many of the
most senior leaders to be indicted, including Slobodan
Milosevic, Radovan Karadi, and Ratko Mladi , remain at large.
11.

Id. at 741.
12. Id. at 746.
13. Meron, supra note 5, at 110.
14. See Fact Sheet, International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, (visited
Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm/> (on file with the Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal). Several other indictees have pleaded guilty.
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For most offenders, especially low-ranking offenders, the
risk of prosecution must appear to be almost the equivalent of
losing the war crimes prosecution lottery. Against that modest
risk must be placed the potential gain. Unattractive as it may be
to think in such terms, some understanding of the motivation of
those who commit war crimes and related offenses is essential to
any consideration of deterrence.
In this regard, the recent survey conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") is illuminating, if
depressing. The ICRC interviewed a significant cross-section of
the population in six war-torn countries, in an effort to ascertain,
among other things, why combatants violate international humanitarian law. 5 Some of those responsible for committing
atrocities may have been a pathological criminal fringe, given
license by civilian authorities to commit mayhem. But the vast
majority of combatants in Bosnia were probably more or less representative of the civilian population of the communities from
which they came. They understood in general terms the limits
imposed on warfare by international humanitarian law. They accepted the legitimacy of such norms, and they believed that such
norms should generally be followed. But at the same time, most
did not view their own actions-even when they involved attacks
on civilians-to be wrongful. 6
In general, the survey suggests that many, perhaps most,
Bosnians viewed the conflict in "total war" terms. The conflict
"mobilized the whole of society," with remarkably high percentages serving as combatants or civilian support. Losses on all
sides were high, and ethnic antagonism was rampant. As a result
of the high degree of societal involvement in the conflict and
the way in which the conflict was fought, "many people in Bosnia-Herzegovina [were] ready to accept that the line between
combatants and civilians was blurred during wartime: they
[were] prepared to attack populated villages and towns; wage
war on civilian areas to hurt the enemy; plant landmines even at
7
risk to civilians; and, where necessary, torture prisoners.'
When asked to explain why civilians were attacked, most of
15. International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") Country Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina, (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http://nt.oneworld.org/cfdocs/icrc/pages/
reports/pdfs/bosnia.pdf> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 14.
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those interviewed focused on "hatred of the other side ...

exac-

erbated by the belief that the other side [was] doing the same
thing."'" In addition, each side "viewed the conflict as a desperate struggle to defend its own community from attack," which
"required suspending the limits" on warfare. 9 For many Bosnians, "[t]he perception that soldiers [were] defending the community from attack change[d] everything with regard to the
rules of war."' 20 For one's own soldiers (the "defenders"), as opposed to the other side's soldiers (the "aggressors"), "the rules
21
would often have to be suspended."
Conversely, because whole communities mobilized to fight
this conflict, bringing "civilians and soldiers together in defense
of their community," the conflict was viewed in a way that did
not "permit a clear distinction" between civilians and soldiers. 22
Instead, it was easy for combatants to assimilate the two and treat
both as legitimate targets.
In addition, foot soldiers in Bosnia had to factor their orders into their decision-making calculus. Many explained attacks on civilians as "mainly a reaction to someone else's design
for the war."'23 In the context of the war, and particularly in the
heat of battle, many soldiers did not feel that they could question their orders. Although superior orders do not constitute a
defense to criminal charges under international law, they may be
considered in mitigation of punishment. This notion reflects a
societal understanding that those subject to orders are not free
actors in the fullest sense. As social psychologist Stanley Milgram
has observed, "[a]n act carried out under command is, psychologically, of a profoundly different character than action that is
spontaneous. The person who, with inner conviction, loathes
stealing, killing, and assault may find himself performing these
acts with relative ease when commanded by authority.

' 24

Mil-

gram explained this unfortunate response to authority as the result of "the fact that a person comes to view himself as the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes, and he therefore
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 13.
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTIIORITY xi

(1974).
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no longer regards himself as responsible for his actions. '25 The
natural human tendency to obey authority is compounded by
military training, propaganda vilifying members of the opposite
community, a belief in the justice of one's cause, and the threat
of penalties, including execution, for failure to comply with orders.26
When the various motivations for attacks on civilians are
combined-the desire to defend one's community, hatred of
the other side, a belief that civilians are essentially indistinguishable from combatants and therefore a threat, and directions
from political and military leaders encouraging such attacks-it
is not surprising that a slight risk of future prosecution will not
have a major deterrent effect. Indeed, in a war of this type, it
may be that even a significant risk of future prosecution will have
relatively little impact.
The ICRC survey focuses on ordinary combatants and civilians. Accordingly, it does not shed any direct light on the motivations of the political leaders most responsible both for the outbreak of war in Bosnia and for the manner in which it was conducted. But most observers believe that indicted leaders such as
Milosevic deliberately fostered inter-communal hostility and conflict as a means to secure and maintain political power and personal wealth. The extent to which such leaders believed in the
ethnic stereotypes and communal goals they promoted is a subject of debate, but either way, it is clear that political leaders who
utilized ethnic cleansing as state policy had strong incentives to
do so.
Moreover, it appears that the leaders at issue viewed the
risks of prosecution as relatively slim. While the issuance of indictments does seem to have undercut the political standing of
some leaders in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict, Karad~i
and Mladi in particular, it is hard to discern any clear evidence
that ICTY prosecutions or indictments deterred political leaders
from continuing to pursue policies of ethnic cleansing. As
noted above, atrocities continued apace in Bosnia well after the
ICTY began its work. Similarly, even after Milosevic was indicted, forces under his control committed numerous atrocities
in Kosovo despite frequent warnings by the ICTY, the Security
25. Id. at xii.
26. Id. at 181-82.
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Council, and individual states that perpetrators would be held
accountable.
It does not follow that the threat of prosecutions had no
effect on military and political actors in the former Yugoslavia.
Serb forces in Kosovo routinely wore black ski masks when engaged in ethnic cleansing; 27 as the prospect of NATO control
over Kosovo loomed larger, Serb forces intensified efforts to conceal mass graves and hide evidence of criminal conduct. 2 But
while this suggests some concern over the possibility of prosecutions, it is hard to conclude that this concern translated into actual deterrence except, perhaps, on a small-scale, sporadic, and
idiosyncratic basis.
II. ENHANCING SPECIFICDETERRENCE THROUGH
INCREASED PROSECUTIONS
Some, including Professor Meron, conclude that the failure
of deterrence in Bosnia and elsewhere stems from the lack of
credibility associated with the warnings of punishment. In this
view, deterrence has failed not because of any inherent difficulty
associated with deterring atrocities in war but rather "because
prosecutions for war crimes on both national and international
planes are so exceptional that criminals do not believe that they
are likely to be prosecuted and punished. '29 Thus, Professor
Meron and others argue that the best approach to deterring future atrocities is to increase sharply the probability of prosecution through more frequent national and international trials.
But this approach is fraught with difficulties.
It will rarely be possible to prosecute more than a representative sampling of those responsible for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Even in the wake of the Holocaust,
the Allies' enthusiasm for criminal prosecutions waned rapidly.
Many senior German war criminals were considered too valuable
to the Allies to prosecute; many others either escaped or were
not pursued. Low-ranking offenders had even less to fear. As
Adam Roberts notes, "[i] n the end, an implicit principle of Nu27. Raymond Whitaker & Andrew Marshall, Massacre Ordered at Top Level in Belgrade, Says US, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 29, 1999, at Title Page.
28. Ellen Knickmeyer, Mass Graves Appear Endless in Kosovo. War Crimes Inspectors
Move From Site to Site GatheringEvidence and Tallying Tales of Death, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
June 23, 1999, at A4.
29. Meron, supra note 5, at 110.
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remberg and Tokyo was to hold highly publicized trials of a few
leaders primarily responsible for a process of criminality in
which hundreds of thousands had in fact been culpable in one
way or another."3 °
In Bosnia, as noted earlier, only a tiny percentage of those
responsible for ethnic cleansing and other crimes are ever likely
to face prosecution. The ICTY lacks the resources, the international political support, and the cooperation of key states and
entities-Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the
Republika Srpska-that would be needed for large-scale prosecutions. Recognizing this, the ICTY has concluded that it must
make "difficult choices" about which of the "many culpable individuals in the former Yugoslavia should be brought to justice in
The Hague."" a The Tribunal has decided to focus its efforts on
bringing to justice the political leaders who instigated the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and who continue to impede the
restoration of peace to the region. 2
Unfortunately, the ICTY has made only limited progress in
its efforts to prosecute senior indictees. In part, this stems from
the lack of cooperation noted above; in part, it stems from western reluctance to disrupt implementation of the Dayton Accords
by vigorously pursuing the arrest of Serb war criminals. 3 As a
result, thirty-five publicly indicted war criminals remain at large,
including the most senior leaders sought by the Tribunal.3 4 The
Tribunal's inability to prosecute either substantial numbers of
lower-level war crimes suspects or any of the most senior figures
responsible for ethnic cleansing sends at best a mixed message
to those who might be inclined to engage in ethnic cleansing in
the future.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR")
faces even greater difficulties. Since its inception in 1994, the
30. Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 26-27 (1995).
31. Statement of ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Nov. 9, 1999 (on file
with the author and the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
32. Id.
33. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations To Search for and Arrest War
Criminals: Government's Failurein the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 411,
450-52 (1997).
34. Carol J. Williams, Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly at Tribunal War Crimes: U.N.
Panel's Record on Bringing Suspects to Trial Suggests 5 Latest Indictees May Remain Free, L.A.
TIMES, May 28, 1999, at A20.
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ICTR has indicted forty-eight individuals, but has tried and sentenced only four.3 5 The Rwandan government, noting the
ICTR's paltry record of prosecutions, felt compelled to "register
a vote of no confidence in the Tribunal," and openly questioned
the deterrent effect of its work. In addition, the Rwandan Government has suggested that if the international community ultimately deemed the two existing war crimes tribunals ineffectual,
it should reconsider its commitment to a permanent International Criminal Court, which might only amount to "a permanent version of a temporary failure .. .
By contrast, as Rwanda's representative to the U.N. General
Assembly has pointed out, Rwandan national courts have issued
more than 20,000 indictments, held 1989 trials, and accepted
17,847 guilty pleas.17 While this might seem to constitute the
kind of effective national prosecutions necessary for deterrence,
some of the genocidaires responsible for mass murder in 1994
nonetheless continue to perpetrate atrocities in Rwanda from
staging areas in the Congo. Moreover, it's not at all clear that
Rwanda's response to mass atrocities-the large-scale prosecutions generally sought by human rights advocates-is appealing
from a human rights standpoint. Rwanda's legal system was shattered by the 1994 genocide. Its current efforts to prosecute tens
of thousands of suspects-some 100,000 Rwandans are in custody in overcrowded, makeshift facilities 3 -clearly strain the
legal system's capacity to treat prisoners decently and to provide
even the minimum requisites of due process. But Rwanda wishes
to go further. It is currently working to revive a traditional system of local ("gacaca") courts, which would be given authority to
prosecute low-level offenders.39 To staff such courts, Rwanda
hopes to select enough judges to conduct public trials before
local communities. 40 Such a system, if implemented, raises obvious due process concerns.
35. The Tribunal at a Glance, (visited Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/factshee.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
One other indictee has pleaded guilty.
36. Statement ofJoseph Mutaboba to the U.N. General Assembly, Nov. 9, 1999 (on
file with the author and the Fordham InternationalLawJournal).
37. Id.
38. Ann M. Simmons, Rwanda Mass Execution Set; Critics Decry Penalty in Genocide
Case, CHICAGO SUN-TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1998, at 27.

39. Id.
40. Id.
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Even if successful, the contribution of such mass prosecutions to deterrence is uncertain at best. Members of the Hutu
community may well view such prosecutions as illegitimate, a
case of "victor's justice." If so, prosecutions may do more to fuel
inter-ethnic tensions than to promote national reconciliation,
and a shift in the political fortunes of the ethnic communities in
Rwanda might lead to a catastrophic renewal of hostilities.
The problems encountered in pursuing war crimes prosecutions in Bosnia and Rwanda highlight some of the difficulties
that must be overcome to achieve deterrence by enhancing the
frequency and consistency of criminal prosecutions. Mustering
the support needed to make international criminal tribunals effective is extremely difficult. The existing tribunals have continuously struggled, with only partial success, to obtain the funding,
personnel, and political support necessary to function even with
relatively modest caseloads. Moreover, Bosnia and Rwanda represent the success stories. Efforts to create ad hoc criminal tribunals to prosecute atrocities in other conflicts have either foundered or not been attempted at all. In Sierra Leone, some of the
political leaders most responsible for the appalling atrocities
committed by the Revolutionary United Front have been given
amnesty and rewarded with positions in a new government, as
the price for terminating that country's civil war.4 1 In Cambodia, a group of experts appointed by the U.N. Secretary General
recommended that the Security Council create an international
criminal tribunal to prosecute senior Khmer Rouge leaders for
crimes committed during the Pol Pot era. But China, among
others, has consistently refused to contemplate the creation of
such a tribunal without the consent of the current Cambodian
government. 42 Although negotiations on the establishment of a
mixed Cambodian-international tribunal continue, it will likely
not be the fully independent body envisioned by the U.N. experts, and it will have a limited mandate at best.43

Similarly, ef-

forts to establish an international tribunal to prosecute crimes
committed during the course of East Timor's recent move towards independence have stumbled over Chinese insistence on
41. SierraLeone Ends 8 Years of Civil War; President, Rebels To Share Power in W. Africa
Nation; Fighters To Get Amnesty, BALTIMORE SUN, July 8, 1999, at I0A.
42. UN Sending Legal Experts to CambodiaLater This Month, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS,

Aug. 9, 1999.
43. Id.
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obtaining Indonesian government consent. 4 4 Worse, there is little likelihood of any prosecutions, international or domestic, for
crimes committed in a host of recent brutal conflicts, ranging
from Chechnya to Sudan.
Supporters of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court often suggest that the ICC will provide a forum for the
prosecution of future cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and make it possible to avoid the selectivity
inherent in the creation of ad hoc tribunals. But the lofty expectations many hold for the ICC resemble the unrealistic expectations once held for the International Court of Justice. Like the
International Court ofJustice, the ICC may well make important
contributions to the clarification and development of international law; it may even contribute modestly to general deterrence, as discussed below. But it is unlikely, in the reasonably
foreseeable future, to have any greater impact on the incidence
of international humanitarian law violations than have the existing ad hoc tribunals.
For one thing, in the absence of a Security Council referral,
the ICC can only claim jurisdiction when the state, in which the
crimes take place or the state of which the accused is a national,
consents. 45 In internal conflicts, nationality and territoriality ordinarily coincide. As a result, in many cases the ICC cannot
prosecute crimes committed in the course of an internal conflict
unless the government responsible accepts the jurisdiction of
the court, either in advance or ad hoc. Since most crimes are
now committed in internal conflicts, and since the states in
which such crimes are most likely are also the states least likely to
ratify the ICC Statute, many internal conflicts will escape the
Court's purview altogether, unless the Security Council can be
induced to act. In addition, to function effectively, the ICC will
need much greater resources than those to which the existing
tribunals have access, as well as broader political support. To
date, the United States has provided the lion's share of the political, financial, technical, and intelligence assistance for the two
existing tribunals. But the United States has already made clear
that it will not support the proposed ICC or sign the ICC Statute
44. Cf Asian Nations Reject Timor War Crimes Trial, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept.
25, 1999, at 15.
45. ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 12.
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in its present form. 4 6 Perhaps European and other states will fill
the gap and provide the necessary resources, but current levels
of support for the existing tribunals does not bode well for the
ICC. Thus, whatever contribution the ICC may make to the deterrence of future atrocities is likely to be modest at best.
Attempts to bolster the deterrent effect of international
prosecutions through increased national prosecutions is also
likely to prove more difficult than many in the human rights
community seem to appreciate. Pinochet-style prosecutions are
likely to increase in number, but to remain sporadic. Austria, for
example, recently refused to initiate proceedings against a highlevel Iraqi official accused of war crimes.4 7 And while many assume that dictators will heed Pinochet's fate, there is little evidence yet to that effect. Serving heads of state may still enjoy
immunity for at least some crimes, and continue to travel
abroad, even in the United Kingdom, with little evident concern
for their future.4 8
Large-scale trials, of the sort conducted by Rwanda, depend
in significant part on battlefield outcome; rather than deterring
future atrocities, they may simply heighten the stakes for victory
in the next conflict. And in many countries, where the principal
offenders retain substantial political and military power, amnesties may preclude most if not all criminal prosecutions. In short,
significantly enhancing the probability of punishment is a far
greater challenge than is often acknowledged.
III. PROCECUTIONS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO
GENERAL DETERRENCE
Payam Akhavan makes the case for general deterrence
along the following lines:
[F]rom the criminal justice system emanates a flow of moral
propaganda such that punishment of the individual offender
is transformed into a means of expressing social disapproval.
In addition to the fear and conscious moral influence of punishment, it is also possible to create "unconscious inhibitions
46. David
INT'L

J.

Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL

L.J. 529 (1999).

47. Colum Lynch, U.S. Aids Hunters of Iraqi War Criminals; Private Groups Suffer Setbacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1999, at A23.
48. See Dictators Are Choosing London To Shop Till They Drop, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 20, 1998, at 22.
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against crime, and perhaps to establish a condition of habitual lawfulness" such that "illegal actions will not present
themselves consciously as real alternatives to conformity, even
in situations where the potential
criminal would run no risk
49
whatsoever of being caught.
Akhavan argues that "it is not necessary . . . to punish a large
number of perpetrators in order to achieve deterrence."5" Instead, "[t] he punishment of particular individuals-whether star
villains such as Karadi or Mladi or ordinary perpetrators such
as Tadi and Erdemovih-becomes an instrument through
which respect for the rule of law is instilled into the popular consciousness."'" In Akhavan's view, international criminal prosecutions can stigmatize ethnic cleansing and similar acts, and thus
contribute "to bringing about a culture of habitual lawfulness
such that persecutions and atrocities do not present themselves
'5 2
as a real alternative to peaceful multiethnic coexistence.
Akhavan may be right that prosecutions can contribute to
replacing a culture of impunity with a culture of compliance, but
a transformation of that magnitude would seem to require far
more than the occasional punishment of a particular offender.
First, the signaling effect of such punishments is not always clear.
Serbs, for example, view the ICTY as biased, and might therefore
refuse to accept its judgments as confirming important social
53
norms.
Second, and more important, the ICRC survey suggests that
the internalization of norms is not sufficient to prevent atrocities. A substantial majority of Bosnians are aware of the Geneva
Conventions, believe that there are limits on what soldiers
should be allowed to do when fighting the enemy, and think that
violations of those limits are morally wrong. While knowledge of
the Geneva Conventions declined with respect to the core issue-attacks on civilians-the ICRC survey nonetheless con49. Akhavan, supra note 7, at 746 (quoting JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND
36 (1974)).
50. Id. at 747.
51. Id. at 749.
52. Id.
53. Justin Brown, World, Facing up to Atrocities?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16,
1999, at 6 (quoting Yugoslav Justice Minister Zoran Knezevic, who accused ICTY of
being biased against Serbs because "as a rule, these kinds of institutions [like the warcrimes tribunal] are political, not legal").
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cludes that understanding and acceptance of the applicable
norms was not the issue in Bosnia:
The high-profile breakdown of the rules of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is all the more striking because both combatants
and civilians are highly aware of the Geneva Conventions and
fully supportive of norms that protect civilians in war. The
limits did not give way because the Conventions or the norms
were unknown or foreign to the participants. They broke
down under the pressure of nationalist passions and hatred.
They also broke down because a range of other wartime considerations diminished and superceded them. The rules of
war have not been repudiated in the minds of those who have
experienced this conflict. They were overwhelmed in large
part by the rules on the ground, which created powerful exceptions, amendments or suspensions whereby millions of civilians joined the front lines.54
The ICRC's conclusion should not be surprising. Even welltrained soldiers from states with strong rule of law cultures commit atrocities during wartime. Canadians were dismayed to learn
that some of their soldiers tortured Somali prisoners while on
U.N. peacekeeping duties. 55 U.S. citizens felt dismay when recent news reports recounted the massacre of civilians by U.S.
soldiers during the Korean War.5 6 These incidents, and countless others like them, took place despite the general culture of
lawfulness that existed in the offenders' home countries.
The problem is again compounded by obedience to authority. As Milgram notes, even a democratic society
cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality
and inhumane treatment at the direction of malevolent authority. A substantial proportion of people do what they are
told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without
limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive
that the
57
command comes from a legitimate authority.
Of course, not everyone, or even a majority, commits atrocities despite exposure to the strains of war. For some, strongly
54. ICRC Country Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina, supra note 15, at iv.
55. Hugh Winsor, The "Trophies" That Shamed Canada, INDEPENDENT (London),

Nov. 13, 1994, at 15.
56. Mark Thompson, The Bridge at No Gun Ri; Did Panicky American G.Ls Massacre
Korean Civilians at the Beginning of the Korean War?, TIME, Oct. 11, 1999, at 42.
57. Milgram, supra note 24, at 189.
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held religious or ethical beliefs, fear of punishment or retaliation, respect for the law, or habitual obedience enables them to
resist whatever impels others to commit crimes. Ultimately,
Akhavan may be right that international criminal prosecutions
will help strengthen whatever internal bulwarks help individuals
obey the rules of war, but the general deterrent effect of such
prosecutions seems likely to be modest and incremental, rather
than dramatic and transformative.
CONCLUSION
Uncertainties about deterrence should not detract from the
many other reasons noted earlier for supporting the prosecution
of those who violate international humanitarian law. But such
uncertainties should make us wary of exaggerated claims concerning the benefits of such prosecutions.
Moreover, present uncertainties suggest the importance of
additional empirical research. The ICRC survey is an extremely
useful step in this direction. Further research might suggest answers to questions such as: what kinds of training should soldiers
receive regarding compliance with the laws of war and, more
generally, how can information on the content of the laws of
war, especially as they pertain to attacks on civilians, be disseminated more effectively? How can the attitudes and incentives of
both leaders and followers be better influenced in conflict situations? Ultimately, a better understanding of the answers to these
and numerous similar questions might do more to avert atrocities than the single-minded pursuit of criminal prosecutions.

